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ABSTRACT
NATO has a legitimate right to project force beyond the
geographical boundaries of the NATO alliance. That NATO has
been unwilling or unable to do so since 1949 results from a
combination of factors relating to disagreements between the
members over the geographical scope of the alliance, shifts
in allied foreign policies and inter-allied tensions brought
on by the Cold War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait moved NATO's
out-of-area problem from a subordinate problem to the primary
threat facing the alliance. Historically, the Alliance felt
that responses to out-of-area security threats should be
dealt with on a unilateral basis, even when the Alliance has
agreed that their collective vital interests are threatened.
The dilemma for NATO is the lack of a unified approach to the
out-of-area problem. NATO's boundaries are boundaries of
obligation and not boundaries of confinement. Through a
review of the language of the treaty and problems inherent in
alliance relationships, this thesis will explore the
differing perceptions of alliance members regarding the scope
of the alliance and why NATO has survived for 40 years yet
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NATO, as a regional alliance developed in 1948/9 under the
umbrella of the United Nations, has a legitimate right to
project force beyond the geographical boundaries of the NATO
alliance. That NATO has been unwilling and or unable to do
so since 1949 results from a combination of factors relating
to disagreements between members over the geographical scope
of the alliance, shifts in allied foreign policies and inter-
allied tensions brought on by the Cold War. One can suggest
that NATO's out-of-area problem is actually a dilemma from
within that stems primarily from a lack of consensus on what
is the exact nature of the out-of-area problem. This lack of
consensus is brought about (and its resolution is hindered
by) the disagreement on the scope of the alliance and its
ability legitimately to participate in the protection of its
interests outside the alliance boundaries. For example, the
United States views Central America and the Caribbean basin
as important to the security of the Alliance based on their
geographic importance in shipping supplies to Europe. The
European allies view Central America as distant and not
remotely connected to the security of the Alliance.
Additionally, the alliance has had difficulty in tackling
the out-of-area problem because of continued shifts in the
foreign policies of its allies. These shifts began at the
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end of World War II with the allies differing opinions
regarding colonialism. Since its involvement in the Korean
War, NATO has been reluctant to exert influence in the
international arena in the defense of its interests as an
alliance or on behalf of its member states.
Finally, the East-West confrontation between the
superpowers caused anxiety among the allies regarding nuclear
escalation of conflicts. The fear of the Soviet Union poised
on the borders of Europe kept the Alliance together in spite
of any internal tensions between the allies. The European
allies needed the commitment of the United States. The
paradox here is that the very same fear that kept them
together is the same fear that kept them from acting
collectively in out-of-area conflicts. That is to say, the
fear of Soviet reprisal for actions taken in conjunction with
the United States initiatives caused many allies to decline
participation in global conflicts. In the context of the
Cold War, few conflicts in the periphery remained outside the
scope of the interests of the superpowers, and once involved,
the potential existed for the conflict to spread or escalate
to a major East-West confrontation. 1
Undoubtedly, the Cold War has had a significant impact on
NATO's inability or unwillingness to project its influence
internationally. Therefore, it would only seem appropriate
'Charles A. Kupchan, "Regional Sezurity and the Out-of-Area Problem,"
eds., Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hamson, Securing Europe's Future
(London:Croom Helm, 1986), p. 282.
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that the end of the Cold War would have the reverse effect on
the alliance and its out-of-area problem. The stand that the
end of the Cold War may only jeopardize NATO's potential to
solve this problem. Before the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the
alliance agreed unanimously that the Soviet Union was their
primary adversary. Although recognized by most alliance
members to be a danger, the out-of-area problem remained
subordinate to the Soviet threat. Now, however, the consensus
among many critics is that the Soviet Union does not pose the
substantial military threat as it did before. Furthermore,
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait gives prominence to out-of-area
conflicts. Central to this issue is whether NATO can align
itself against a threat that is not as clearly and neatly
defined as the Soviet threat once was.
Chapter I will discuss the legitimacy of NATO's right to
act out-of-area by reviewing the factors influencing the
development of the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly as
they relate to the geographical boundaries outlined in the
treaty. The debate centered around the boundaries of the
alliance is an old problem that has yet to find a solution.
The boundaries outlined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic
Treaty are boundaries of obligation and not boundaries of
confinement. Through a review of the language of the treaty
and the negotiations that preceded the signing of the treaty,
this thesis will argue that NATO is not limited in scope by
the treaty to deal with only those threats that emerge within
the boundaries of Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
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Chapter II suggests that NATO has failed to act out-of-
area in the past because NATO lacks consensus -- consensus in
the sense of what precisely is the out-of-area problem. NATO
has never developed a commor approach to define the nature of
the threat and furthermore, what method should be used to
oppose that threat. NATO has yet to agree on what the vital
interests of the alliance are much less on how to defend
them. NATO, as an alliance for self-defense, is dedicated to
the security of the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In that context, there are certain vital interests that
should be protected regardless of the geographical boundaries
outlined in the treaty. For example, access to oil and raw
materials is vital to stability of every country in the world
but particularly to European nations who import the bulk of
their oil from the Persian Gulf. Free access to shipping
lanes and the sovereignty of every nation are other examples
of issues where NATO's out-of-area effort would not be
considered out-of-line.
NATO's lack of consensus is created by the interplay of
several factors. First, divergent foreign policies and
objectives of the different NATO allies have barred the
development of a common strategic approach to dealing with
issues, other than a direct Soviet threat, that in the past
have threatened the interests of the alliance and/or its
members. Without a consensus, this will continue to be a
problem in the future and further hinder NATO's ability to
find an amicable solution to the out-of-area problem. Much
4
of the dispute surfaced at the end of World War II with
problems stemming from ditfering allied opinions regarding
colonialism. From the beginning France, in a sense, created
an out-of-area problem, from the Anglo-Saxon perspective, by
insisting that Algeria be included in the boundaries of the
treaty.. This problem has metamorphasized i. to a debate about
the very "nature" of the threat facing the alliance at the
end of the century. The United States tended to view the
cause of turmoil in the world as a by-product of the Soviet
Union's efforts to undermine Third World countries and
further the expansion of communism. On the other hand, most
Europeans would argue that the problem is more North-South.
That is to say, the root of all evil lies in the inability of
Third World countries to make themselves economically viable
in the international market.
Secondly, the Cold War has played an important role in
NATO's inability to form a common strategic approach to the
out-of-area problem. When the United States finally
committed troops to Europe at the end of World War II, many
Europeans finally felt secure that they would not be left
alone should the Soviet Union advance across the border into
Germany. But, in addition tc the the fear of the Soviet
threat, there remained a great deal of apprehension about a
resurgent Germany, especially in 1949-50 when rearmament of
the Federal Republic of Germany was mentioned. After the
Korean War, when the United States turned to a more
interventionist global foreign policy, many Europeans found
5
it difficult to support American initiatives. This is
because the Europeans tended to see the American's as too
r g to resort to force which caused further dissention
among the allies. More specifically, many allies fear
reprisal if they back, politically or militarily, the foreign
policies of other allies. Compounding the problem is a
common belief among many Europeans that unilateral actions by
the United States are antagonistic toward the Soviet Union.
Finally, it is important to mention the continued impact
of the burdensharing debate on NATO's out-of-area problem.
The United States in 1947 initiated the Marshall Plan to
rebuild the war-torn economies of Europe. With this plan the
United States had visualized a revitalized Europe providing
for its own defense. The American legislature soon, however,
began to feel pressure, especially after Vietnam, to let the
European countries shoulder more of the expense for their
defense. While this topic in and of itself is one worthy of
a more detailed discussion, it is the use of burdensharing
problem to avoid participation in out-of-area conflicts that
is important to understanding the nature of NATO's out-of-
area problem. As well, it is the use of that debate and
dissention in the alliance that further erodes the cohesion
of the alliance to develop a consensus to deal with its out-
of-area problem. All these factors have inhibited NATO's
ability to effectively deal with its out-of-area problem. In
fact, they have made NATO's "out-of-area" problem an
"internal" problem.
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Chapter III will review the current crisis in the Persian
Gulf as it relates to NATO and its out-of-area problem. NATO,
as visioned by its founders, was developed to counter threats
to its security together. To continue to respond to security
threats unilaterally defeats the purpose of the alliance.
The NATO allies have responded in an unparalleled show of
support for United States initiatives in the Gulf, however,
that response continues to be at a national level. Does the
alliance have a valid response, collectively in the Gulf?
Considering the dilemmas of the past, can NATO support the
United Nations and the United States efforts to turn back the
events since August?
Some critics would argue that the Conference on Security
and Confidence in Europe (CSCE) or the Western European Union
(WEU) are the security frameworks for the future. Neither of
these assemblies has the organization framework established
to deal with the military aspect of security which must be
considered. Furthermore, since Article 52 of the United
Nations Charter allows the UN to utilize collective security
arrangements to preserve peace, is this something that can or
should be done? Essentially, this is presently the case in
the Persian Gulf. The United Nations has agreed to enforce
sanctions against Iraq. This global consensus provides
domestic as well and international rationale for supporting
the rrilitary effort against Iraqi forces. If the united
efforts of the allies is successful, it will provide a solid
7
foundation to build a unified strategy for dealing with the
out-of-area problem.
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II.GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES AND THE TREATY
Alliance relationships are a difficult paradox. Problems
are inherent in relationships that are dedicated to the
preservation of national freedom and self-determination.
Yet, in order to accomplish this goal, a country must
relinquish certain degree of control to organizations such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Undoubtedly, national
sovereignty is not something in which a country is willing
to have its allies participate.
"The idea of free men and free minds in an open society,
which is the essence of the North Atlantic civilization,
defies the rote of history."'2 From 1789 to the development of
NATO, the unique geopolitical circumstances of the United
States almost precluded association in an alliance. Avoiding
"entangling alliances" became more than a policy; .it became
a national expression for many Americans about the position
of the United States in the world, a view which contrasted
the simple virtues of the Republic. 3 Likewise, the European
nations view international relationships from a completely
different perspective based on their own historical
2Robert Strausz-Hupe, James E. Dougherty and William R. Kintner, eds.,
Building the Atlantic World (New York:Harper & Row Publishers, 1963),
p.2.
3David Fromkin, "Entangling Alliances," Foreign Affairs 48, no. 2 (July
1970): p. 688.
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experiences. For the most part, European alliances, prior to
NATO, were narrowly defined groupings that were developed to
achieve a specific goal. There were few shared interest
between the members beyond the attainment of a specified
goal. As a result, alliance relationships were very short
lived, and NATO, as such, is an anomaly.
Involvement in NATO became the first extra-hemispheric
relationship for the United States since the Treaty of
Mortefontaine in 1800. As a collective defense organization,
NATO was established as a response to an increasing threat
from the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. "In
many ways the war was like a great and violent tide which,
when it receded, left the United States beached or embedded
all along the periphery of Eurasia."4
By participating in NATO, the United States hoped to
achieve two goals. The primary motive was to develop an
effective counter threat to Soviet efforts to subvert the
war-torn economies and political institutions of Europe. The
second less obvious goal of the United States was to re-
build a strong European balance of power against the Soviet
Union. This second goal of American policy toward Europe was
important because it would be influential in determining the
latitude of commitment from the United States. However, the
United States efforts to rebuild a European security
4Aaron Friedberg, "America's Strategic Position," Parameters XVI, no. 4
(Winter 1986): p. 30.
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arrangement would not be possible without the inclusion of
West Germany. This being the case, European fears about a
resurgent Germany would also have to be eased. This goal was
accomplished as the United States progressively involved
itself in the North Atlantic Alliance. America's commitment
was the instrument through which Germany could be accepted
into a security arrangement. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 not
only emphasized the importance of the Mediterranean to the
stability of Europe, it helped direct the thrust of American
assistance programs toward the rehabilitation of western
Europe as a key element in the balance of power against the
Soviet Union.5
Agreement to join the North Atlantic Treaty marked a
revolutionary change in foreign policy, not only for the
United States, but for Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland as
well. The decision for these countries to sign the treaty
was a difficult one. The United States spent much of the
initial discussions opposing the creation of such a treaty.
The paradox is that the alliance was not designed around the
Cold War politics of the United States, but after the
invasion of South Korea in 1950, the alliance became the
principal instrument of the cold war policies of the United
States. 6 An historical review of the factors influencing the
5Timothy P. Ireland Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport,
Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 10.
6Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto:McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1977), p. 11.
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development of the North Atlantic Treaty explains some
insight into why the treaty language is so vague regarding
the out-of-area problem.
A. BEFORE THE TREATY
In the spring of 1948, a fear of aggressive communist
policies created apprehension among the western countries.
Economic instability only served to enhance political chaos
in Europe and there was fear in the United States that the
governments of France and Italy would fall to communist
subversion. Lester B. Pearson, co-author of the North
Atlantic Treaty commented, "This treaty, though born of fear
and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social,
economic, and political achievements if it is to live --
achievements which will extend beyond the time of emergency
which gave it birth, or the geographical area which it now
inc .ude."7 The authors and signers of the treaty did not
reject the potential global reach of the alliance as
evidenced by Mr. Pearson's comment.
The treaty had much of its foundations in the Rio Pact and
the Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance. But before the
treaty was signed or a design was agreed upon, several models
for regional alliances were recommended. In fact, the United
States labored with difficulty over whether or not a
unilateral declaration by the President with Congressional
7Emphasis added. Comment made at the signing of the Treaty 4 April 1949
as cited in Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 11.
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backing was sufficient assurance of security commitment to
Europe. Canada also considered making a declaration similar
to that which the United States was contemplating.
Tripartite talks were to be held between the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom about the creation of a
mutual defense pact. The commonwealth had just gained three
new members; India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Britain obviously
considered the members of the commonwealth as potential
alliance partners and, therefore, suggested that the members
of the commonwealth unite within a series of three systems.
One system would involve the U.K, the U.S. and the Benelux;
the second, a Mediterranean system and, finally, an "Atlantic
Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance." The conveniently
formed commonwealth also moved Escott Reid to suggest to
Lester Pearson, Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs, that all nine members of the commonwealth should be
original members of the alliance. 8 However, the realization
that including exposed and weak countries such as Pakistan
and India would only increase the liability for the other
members of the alliance. Therefore, it was agreed at the
tripartite discussions that a self-defense alliance under
article 51 could provide a framework for a universal security
system. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin stated in a
message to Secretary of State George Marshall that "a real
defense system worked out by the United States of America,
8EScott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 100
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Canada, the United Kingdom and the western European states
would.. .be the first great step towards what could ultimately
become a real world collective security system, in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations."9
Unfortunately, the ideal of a world wide security system
soon gave way to the realities of the time. There was
growing sentiment in the United States and Canada that tended
to favor a more conservative and isolationist approach to
European security and harbored a lingering contempt for
western Europeans. Then Canadian Prime Minister Mackensie
King said on March 30, 1939, "the idea that every 20 years
this country should automatically and as a matter of course
take part in a war overseas for democracy or self-
determination of other small nations, that a country which
has all it can do to run itself should feel called upon to
save, periodically, a continent that cannot run itself, and
to these ends to risk the lives of its people, risk
bankruptcy and political disunion, seems to many a nightmare
and sheer madness."'0 This was a very popular sentiment in
Canada and the United States. However, a large number of
Europeans, particularly in Britain and France, realized that
the United States was the only formidable power to oppose the
Soviet Union and would have to be included in order for any
9Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, p. 80.
1 0House of Commons Debate 1939, Vol III, 2419, in Reid, Time of Fear and
Hope, p. 127.
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collective self-defense alliance to be effective.
Ultimately, the State Department came to a similar
conclusion. This recognition of the need for American
support paved the way for increased American participation.
In essence, the complexities of European security issues,
demanded American involvement because of the need to
reassure Europe, primarily France, on the German question.
Nonetheless, nothing could be accomplished without
Congressional support and approval. In fact, Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson was negotiating on one hand with the
foreign governments involved in the alliance deliberations
and on the other hand with the Foreign Relations Committee.
The political situation in the United States before the
1948 November elections made it essential that there should
be close consultation between the U.S. Administration and the
Senate in the making of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Assistance and support was sought from Senator Vandenberg not
only because of his position with the Foreign Relations
Committee but also because he was in the favored position for
selection as the Republican candidate for President in the
upcoming elections. Although less than enthusiastic, he did
see the need for some U.S. association within a European
security system. The Vandenberg Resolution of 1948 gave the
State Department the necessary support to assure France that
the United States was committed to the security of Europe.
15
This in turn moved the French gcvernment toward accepting the
London Agreements on the German question.11
B. THE RIO PACT
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also
known as the Rio Pact) was signed on September 2, 1947. "The
Rio Pact, a regional arrangement aimed both at joint
peacemaking within the Western Hemisphere itself and at
collective defense against extra-hemispheric aggression,
proved that effective multilateral action, consonant with the
UN purposes, was still possible."12 Several articles in the
"Rio Treaty" would later serve as a model for the North
Atlantic Treaty. Article 3 of the Rio Pact states that
armed aggression against an American state would be
considered aggression against all American States. Article
51 of the United Nations Charter provided the basis for their
collective and individual self-defense against such an
attack. An important caveat to this article was the
provision in paragraph two which allowed each state to
"determine the immediate measures which it may take in
fulfillment of the obligations contained in article 3....,,13
In essence, the signatories are not obligated to provide
"
1Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport,
Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 112.
12Alan K. Henrikson, ed., Negotiating World Order (Wilmington,
Delaware:Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), p. 117.
13The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947.
16
assistance to another member under attack. Furthermore, the
treaty lacked a distinction between an attack by signatories
and an attack by non-members of the treaty.
Another important article in the Rio Pact that will have
bearing on the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 4. In this
article, signatories considered a geographic zone delineated
within the treaty as important for the allies to understand
the extent of their obligations. One significant difference
between the two treaties is the lack of provision in the Rio
Pact for a peace time military force. The United States,
during the formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty, was
insistent that the new treaty contain non-restrictive
language to provided as much latitude as possible.
C. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented that the treaty
"is designed to fit precisely into the framework of the
United Nations and to assure practical measures for
maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter." 14
However, European and American approaches to the development
of a regional alliance treaty were diametrically opposed.
The Europeans, particularly France, desired strong language
and binding guarantees from the United States should an
attack on Europe occur. With a strong pledge of commitment,
the Europeans felt the greater effect the treaty would have
14Dean G. Acheson, "The Meaning of the North Atlantic Pact," Department
of State Bulletin 20, no. 508 (March 27, 1949):57-58.
17
on deterring the Soviet Union. The United States, on the
other hand, was anxious to avoid such "binding commitments"
to European defense.The American delegation tended to
emphasize the need for a weaker pledge of commitment. The
weaker the pledge, the less difficult it would be to secure
Congressional approval. Congress was unwilling, if not down
right adamant about commiting the United States to some
future war in Europe. Perhaps this is why so much of the
North Atlantic Treaty so closely resembles the Rio Pact.
The Soviet blockade of Berlin prompted the French to
insist upon further assistance from the United States in the
form of military equipment. This request ultimately took
the form of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because
this article was a unique provision of the Atlantic Alliance
and had no precedence, it constituted a true departure from
traditional American foreign policy, a departure that
eventually would entangle the United States in a permanent
military alliance. 15  Finally, after much debate, the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington,
D.C.
Forty years later, riding on the tide of apparent success
over Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, NATO's internal
problem in the form of "out-of-area" conflicts remains
unsolved. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait, like the fall of the
15Timothy P. Ireland Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport,
Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 81.
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Berlin Wall, has changed all that was once so familiar and
routine in the world of international relations. The Soviet
Union is allied with the West, the United Nations is unified
as never before, and collective security is resurrected from
the ashes of the League of Nations and the United Nations as
the peace keeping force structure for the future.
D. THE ARTICLES
The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the
spirit of the treaty. It states that "the parties of the
Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of
the charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all governments. ',16 The preamble
and articles of the North Atlantic Treaty remain the most
relevant source for trying to understand the true intent of
the treaty whether stated or implied. And while the preamble
is specified as its greatest aim, it is interesting to
remember that neither the preamble nor any of the subsequent
articles identifies a specific adversary from one particular
area or that the adversary will only utilize military means.17
In this way the scope of the alliance is very global and not
directed solely at the Soviet Union. However, any
understanding or interpretation of the North Atlantic Treaty
16North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949.
17Peter N. Schmitz, "Is NATO an Island," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher,
Evolving European Defense Policies (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath
and Company, 1987), . 69.
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Articles must be viewed in the context of the articles of the
United Nations Charter. Articles 51-54 of the UN Charter
provide for the development of regional alliances and
collective self-defense and are specifically related to
NATO's out-of-area problem.
1. United Nations Charter
a. Chapter VII
Titled "Action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," Article 51
of the United Nations Charter states that "nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. ''18  It is under this article that the
members of the North Atlantic Treaty exercise their riqht of
individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.
President Truman noted at the treaty signing ceremony that
"To protect this area against war will be a long step toward
permanent peace in the whole world."19
It is interesting to speculate why the founders of
the Treaty specified Article 51 in particular when in
actuality, Articles 52-54 of Chapter VIII in the United
18United Nations Charter, June 1945.
19Address of the President of the United States, U.S., Department of
State Bulletin 20, no. 511 (April 17, 1949): p. 481-82.
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Nations Charter govern the creation and scope of regional
alliances. The primary argument proffered is that utilizing
Article 51 vice the articles in Chapter VIII precludes the
Soviet Union from utilizing its veto power to block
collective self-defense actions taken by the Alliance
members. Obviously this fear motivated the potential
signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to strive for
language similar to the Brussels Treaty which specifically
cites article 51 as the justification for the creation of the
treaty. Article 51 is not actually the governing article for
the creation of a regional alliance. In addition to
mentioning the inherent right of individuals to protect
themselves against armed attack, it also specifies that
"measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.,,20
b. Chapter VIII
Chapter VIII, which incorporates articles 52-54, on
the other hand is titled "Regioral Alliances" and
specifically deals with the development and actions of
regional alliances. Chapter VIII should have been cited as
20Charter of the United Nations.
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the pertinent article for creation of the North Atlantic
Treaty. However, article 53 of Chapter VIII states:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority. But no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy
state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this article.
21
The statement "without authorization of the Security
Council," caused a great deal of apprehension on the part of
the prospective signatories of the Treaty in that the Soviet
Union, as a member of the Security Council with veto power,
would be able to intervene in the defensive actions taken by
the alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty would not have been
subject to the veto powers of the Soviet Union taking the
literal definition of the two articles.
The North Atlantic Treaty could have been created
under Chapter VIII which clearly provides for the development
of such arrangements. Article 51 which speaks to the
inherent right of an alliance to use individual or collective
self-defense against an armed attacked would have provided
for the security of the alliance against enemies including
the Soviet Union. However, the binding requirement to
receive the blessing of the Security Council speaks to the
use of regional arrangements for enforcement actions and not
the right of a regional alliance to provide for its self
21Emphasis added. Article 53 of the United Nations Charter.
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defense against armed attack. However, this subtle
distinction was not enough assurance for the allies that the
Soviet Union would not be able to intervene and eventually
led the signatories to push for a statement citing article 51
as the relevant article for the creation of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
The Ambassadors' Committee at its final meeting
during the treaty negotiations agreed to an "understanding"
which, while not denying that the treaty created a regional
arrangement, recorded the intention of the parties to stress
in their public statements the primary purpose of the treaty.
The summation of their understanding was "to provide for the
collective self-defence of the parties, as countries having
common interests in the North Atlantic area", a primary
purpose which was "recognized and preserved by Article 51,
rather than any specific connection with Chapter VIII or
other Articles of the United Nations Charter.22
Article 51, taken literally, however, states that
the United Nations will not prevent any nation from its
inalienable right to protect itself from armed attack. The
founders of the North Atlantic Treaty selected this article
to avoid Soviet intervention in the Alliance's inherent right
for self-defense. It should not be used as a means to
22 Escott Reid, as a member of the drafting committee provides an
exhaustive account of the negotiations and debate surrounding Article 51
of the United Nations Charter in Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.
191.
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prevent the alliance from taking enforcement action when its
interests are threatened. Additionally, Article 52 provides
that Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action
under its authority. In essence, NATO could become the
"world's police force."
2. North Atlantic Treaty Articles
a. Article 4 - "Consultation"
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty delineates
the guidelines for alliance consultation. When the policy of
one ally in a military alliance increases the risks of war
for other allies, the policy becomes the concern of all the
allies.23  The importance of consultation as paramount to
creating cohesion and trust among members was realized by the
founders of the treaty and therefor incorporated in Article
4. In September 1948, Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Foreign
Minister, commented that "the sharing of risks, resources and
obligations must be accompanied by, and flow from a share in
the control of policy." He went on to say, "If obligations
and resources are to be shared, it is obvious that some sort
of constitutional machinery must be established under which
each participating country will have a fair share in
determining the policies of all which affect all." He also
realized that "without their consent, the policy of one or
23Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 162.
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two or three may increase the risks and therefore the
obligations of all. ''2
4
Article 4 also exhibits the universal scope of the
alliance because it does not delineate where the threat must
come from. The agreed interpretation of the article states
that it is "applicable in the event of a threat in any part
of the world, to the security of any of the Parties,
including a threat to the security of their overseas
territories."'25  In other words, when the United States took
military action in Panama in December of 1989, any of its
NATO allies could have requested consultation under Article
4, if in their opinion the actions of the United States
threatened their security. While these interpretations are
not formally a part of the treaty, they do constitute the
understanding of the representatives participating in the
discussions as to the meanings of the articles. "The
universal extent of the provisions on consultation in the
North Atlantic Treaty reflected the fact that if the United
States, Britain or France became involved in armed conflict
with the Soviet Union anywhere in the world, the conflict
would almost inevitably spread to the North Atlantic treaty
24Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson
(Toronto, 1973), II, pp. 52-3.
25Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, IV, p. 222-223.
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area and thereby bring the pledge of assistance in the treaty
into operation. ''26
b. Article 5 - "The Pledge"
The very heart of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is the promise of assistance to another member
under attack. In most instances, this particular provision
would be referred to as a guarantee. However, the United
States objected to the term, guarantee. Therefore, the
provision was referred to in the negotiations as "the
pledge."27 Article 5 states, "The parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all .... ",28 The
type of assistance to be rendered and the obligation to
provide assistance was argued over the entire 12 months of
negotiations. From the European perspective, the stronger
the pledge, the more impact the treaty would have as a
deterrent, particularly where the West Germany was concerned.
The Europeans favored a treaty that was patterned after the
Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 or the Brussels Pact of 1948 not only
because they contained language specific about using "all
military means available" but more so because these
particular treaties were directed specifically against a
26EScOtt Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 166
27Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 143.
28North Atlantic Treaty
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renewal of aggression by Germany. 29  Interestingly enough,
while the Europeans were concerned about the threat from the
East, it is evident that they worried about American
commitment to European security more because of Germany than
from the Soviet Union. The Europeans were assured of U.S.
commitment should the Soviets cross the border into Germany
but they were not as convinced about American assistance
against a revitalized and rearmed Germany. It seems as
though the Europeans failed to remember that the United
States fought with Europe in two world wars against Germany.
The American perspective about including a pledge
was such that the less restrictive the treaty the less
resistance the United States administration would have in
securing the Congressional approval for ratification.30  As
mentioned before, assistance and support was solicited from
Senator Vandenberg and received in the form of the Vandenberg
Resolution. Up to the point when the resolution was passed,
consultation between the administration, treaty negotiators
and Congress was fluid and frequent. After the resolution
was approved and the primary objective of gaining initial
congressional support was accomplished the consultations
were few and far between. This lack of communication erupted
in an unexpected and impromptu debate on the floor of the
Senate which centered almost entirely around the language of
29Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, p. 222.
30Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope , p. 143.
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Article 5. Congress was unwilling to commit in writing to
such a strongly worded pledge of support to its European
allies. Senators Connelly and Vandenberg were now adamant
that Article 5 should expressly state that was no moral or
otherwise obligation to go to war.31
The debate about the wording of Article 5 is
summarized most appropriately in a message sent by the
Canadian High Commissioner to the Department of External
Affairs, "If there is no satisfactory pledge in the treaty,
and if the treaty is interpreted by the Senate merely as a
mechanism for getting the European states out of difficulties
which really don't concern the United States directly, then
its value is greatly reduced and we might have to re-examine
out whole position.32  The message goes on to say, "The
purposes of the treaty are not going to be fulfilled by an
undertaking which is so watered down that it does not create
even a moral obligation to take effective action, but is put
forward as a charitable donation from the United States. 33
Ultimately, the article was broadened sufficiently to appease
the U.S. Congress while keeping the Europeans quasi-assured
of an American commitment.
31Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 152
32Message sent from the Canadian High Commissioner, (London) to
Department of External Affairs, (Brussels) 16 February 1949, in Escott
Reid, Time of Fear and Hope , p. 154.
33Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope , p. 154.
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However, the term "guarantee" was not the only
disagreeable item in the treaty. The U.S. Congress
continued to exhibit isolationist tendencies. Specifically,
Congress felt that because the President had the power to use
military force without congressional approval to repel an
attack against the United States, the chief executive would
have the same right to by-pass Congress. Therefore, the
wording of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was couched
so as to conform more with the "Monroe Doctrine formula". 34
What this implied was a pledge more along the lines of the
Rio Pact which obligated members to regard attack against one
as an attack against all and to take whatever steps deemed
appropriate to provide assistance. As a result, technically
speaking, the United States was not bound militarily to the
security of Western Europe. Ironically, the United States
channeled its efforts to bring West Germany into NATO and in
an effort to secure a rather aloof position for itself while
France was seeking increased American involvement in Europe
as a way of keeping Germany down.
Finally the members of the North Atlantic alliance
agreed to consider an armed attack on one as an attack
34For a more detailed discussion about the negotiations in Congress
regarding Presidential powers pertaining to the North Atlantic Treaty
and the State Departments impact statement see, U. S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vandenberg Resolution and
the North Atlantic Treaty, Hearings Held In Executive Session before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 80th Congress, 2nd session
on S. 239 and 81st Congress, 1st session on Executive L, The North
Atlantic Treaty.
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against them all, to come forth with assistance should such
an attack occur and that the form of assistance would be that
which is deemed necessary up to and including the use of
force to maintain the security of the Atlantic alliance.
Interestingly enough, only when the United States committed
troops to NATO under Article 3 did the Europeans feel
confident that the United States would actually come to their
defense.
The allies turned their discussions to dealing with
the threat from indirect aggression. After all, the
Europeans were as worried if not more so about the use of
indirect aggression by the Soviet Union to perhaps encourage
and assist in subversive actions to help topple governments
or to aid rival factions in coming to power.
As was indicative of most of the negotiations,
developing a definition that was suitable to all parties
involved proved to be almost impossible. Escott Reid's
argument for including a statement in the treaty about
indirection aggression was that "the new treaty will look
pretty futile if it is a treaty to guarantee us against the
kind of attacks on our independence which might have been
made 30 years ago but not the kind of attacks which may be
made during the next weeks and months. ' 35
Mr. Reid's point was well made in that the Soviet
Union had dropped no bombs when Czechoslovakia had fallen in
35EScott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 157.
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1948. However, the British were instrumental in killing any
proposals that surfaced regarding the indirect aggression
aspect of a security threat. Primarily because they felt and
were able to convince enough of their allies that including
any definition of indirect aggression might be misconstrued
as an attempt to meddle in the affairs of other states. As a
result, it was agreed by the tripartite drafting group that
the proposed treaty should not contain explicit provisions on
indirect aggression but that the treaty would merely provide
for consultation in the event an ally felt threatened by
indirect aggression.
c. Article 6 - "The Boundaries"
Article 6, perhaps one of the most explicit articles
in the treaty, specifies that the NATO area is defined as the
territory of NATO states, the Mediterranean Sea and the
Atlantic south to the Tropic of Cancer.36  This article is
most often quoted as the reason for avoiding the "out-of-
area" problem. Article 6 defines those geographical areas
that are considered "hands off zones" to potential
aggressors, whether or not the aggressor is a member of the
alliance. As with the Rio Pact, the boundaries help to also
define for the signatories the extent of their obligations.
"There is no constitutional limitation in the Treaty against
the allies acting as an alliance in pursuit of the active
36Trevor Taylor, European Defense Cooperation (London:Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1986), p. 67.
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principles of contribution to and promotion of peace and
stability in international relations as described in Article
2. " 37 However, the United Nations Charter requires compliance
when determining how this is to be achieved.
The acceptance of Greece and Turkey in 1951, the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1955/6 and Spain in 1982
indicates that the boundaries are expandable. In fact,
specific mention of Turkey in Article II of the Protocol is
made because, historically, Turkey is not considered a
European state. "Judging by the intractable nature of the
disputes between Greece and Turkey, the extension of NATO
membership beyond the Atlantic area has been a mixed
blessing. ,,38
Article 6 also expands the meaning of armed attack
to the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the parties,
when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe
in which occupation forces of any of the parties were
stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or
the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic Area north of the
Tropic of Cancer." Interestingly enough, the Treaty leaves
the American state of Hawaii uncovered.39 More important is
37Peter N. Schmitz, "Is NATO an Island," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher,
Evolving European Defense Policies (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath
and Company, 1987), p. 71.
38Marc Bentinck, NATO's Out-of Area Problem, Adelphi Papers 211, Autumn
(London:IISS, 1986): p. 7.
39Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 23.
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the fact that the treaty, as signed, does not preclude the
Soviet Union from becoming a member. In light of events
taking place in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, this
concept is not as impossible as it once seemed.
Additional supporting evidence of a perceived global
application of the North Atlantic Treaty is provided in the
comments and communiques since the inception of the Treaty
to the present. The Joint Communique by the North Atlantic
Council in September 1949 stated that the "objective of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to assist in achieving
the primary purpose of the United Nations -- the maintenance
of international peace and security." Similarly, the NATO
communique in January 1958 states that , "the free world must
organize its resources -- moral, military, political and
economic -- and be ready to deploy them wherever the
situation demands." The communique goes on to say the the
alliance "cannot therefore be concerned only with the North
Atlantic area or only with military defense.. .and take
account of developments outside its own area."'40
Initial discussions regarding the membership to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization also reveals that the
scope of the Alliance was to deal more with the threat to the
Alliance rather than limiting its actions to a particular
geographic scope. When the negotiations began about who
would be extended membership invitations into the alliance,
40NATO Letter, 6., no. 1 (January 1958): p. 10.
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the United States was at the forefront in insistinq tLYL the
"stepping stone" nations be included in tiie alliance. These
countries included Norway (for Spitzenbergen), Denmark (for
Greenland), Portugal (for the Azores), Iceland, and Ireland.4"
Initially, France was opposed to the inclusion of nations
outside the Brussels Pact. The United States claimed that
Spitzenbergen was not necessarily vital for use by the United
States but that it would be very important to the Soviet
Union for advanced positioning against allied forces. As
well, Greenland provided the United Sates with forward
positioning for its air defense and that in many ways these
"stepping stone" countries were more important to the
security of the United States and Canada than some of the
countries in western Europe.42 Eventually, even France came
to realize the geographical importance of each of these
countries to the rearmament of Europe.
"The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 created the first
multilateral military alliance to span the North Atlantic
Ocean in time of peace. '43 Since that time, the alliance has
undergone many changes, faced problems of cohesion and unity,
been involved in extra-european affairs and conflicts. Yet,
ir. spite of the problems it has faced, the alliance ha3
remained in tact. The duration of the North Atlantic Treaty
41Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 195.
42Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, 215.
43Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 9.
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Organization's existence is quiet unusual given the
historical experience of alliances. The Korean war forced
the alliance to face the realities of its security problems.
That such a conflict occured so soon after the alliance was
formed must have further implanted in the minds of the NATO
members that alliance relationships are essential to the
security of not only the allies but to the entire world.
The geographical boundaries in the alliance have
often times provided iks members with an easy excuse to avoid
involvement in out-of-area conflicts. However, having looked
at the language of the treaty and the negotiations involved
in the development of the treaty is clear that the
geographical boundaries outlined in Article 6 of the treaty
are not boundaries of confinement, rather, they are
boundaries of "obligation" that delineate the
responsibilities of each member to assist and support its
allies when their security is threatened. But the clarity of
the geographical boundaries and their meaning only creates
additional problems within the alliance.
There are problems inherent in alliance
relationships and NATO is no exception. The following pages
will review some of those problems, such as defining the
threats to the alliance, the differing opinions of how to
deal with those threats, problems in alliance cohesion
created by burdensharing and consultation and the effect of
divergent foreign policies on the ability of the alliance to
deal with the out-of-area problem.
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III. ALLIANCE DILEMMAS
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO has been
applauding its apparent victory over the Soviet Union
claiming alliance cohesion and unity of purpose as the key to
success. The reality is that NATO has not always experienced
this "unity", especially when dealing with the out-of-area
problem. From 1945 until the mid 1960's, decolonialization
caused a significant shift in European desires and
willingness to control even their most important economic
territories. The realities of the Korean war also served to
change forever the ability of NATO to act effectively as an
alliance. Since, that time, the European viewpoint has been
that diversion of NATO forces outside of Europe would
essentially leave the alliance defenseless. The United
States, in a major change of foreign policy away from its
traditional isolationist stance began to view many conflicts
around the world as further attempts by the Soviet Union to
undermine the free world and that the alliance should act to
counter the Soviet Union's efforts. These conflicting views
on what NATO's foreign policy should be remains a major
stumbling block within the alliance and further hinders its
ability to effectively cope with 'extra-european conflict'.
When the out-of-area problems surfaces, as it has many
times in the past, NATO allies select one of many reasons to
36
justify their inaction. As discussed in Chapter I, some
allies claim that geographical limitations prohibit out-of-
area actions. Other allies profess that acting
internationally only serves to provoke the Soviet Union and
deepen the rift between the two superpowers. These
inconsistent views on the source of international conflict,
especially in the Third World, only provides more
justification and technicalities for the allies to hind
behind.
Although each of these claims has a degree of validity to
them, it is the lack of a unified approach to the out-of-area
problem that remains NATO's out-of-area problem. This
chapter will deal with the problems that have contributed to
NATO's inability to deal effectively, if at all, with the
out-of-area problem. Gasnost and Perestroika are having a
lasting effect on this dilemma and their impact will be
brought forth in Chapter III. However, for the purpose of
this section, it is important to regard any analysis of
NATO's involvement or perceptions about out-of-area conflicts
in the context of international relations prior to the Fall
of 1989.
A. DEFINING THE OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEM
NATO's out-of-area problem is indeed old. "The out-of-
area issue presents members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization with the difficulty of balancing their
collective interest in North Atlantic security with their
37
variously shared and perceived commitments in other parts of
the world."'44  And while this problem has been around since
the inception of the North Atlantic Treaty, there has yet
to be a successful conclusion to this dilemma.
The definition of the term "out-of-area" can be viewed as
anything that happens beyond the boundaries outlined in
Article 6 as an "out-of-area" problem. With the Carter
doctrine announced, the Alliance was debating a new issue
under the heading of "out-of-area operations," thus reducing
the complex problem of "military contingencies" for the
alliance and placing them outside the treaty boundaries.45
The actions that allies take, or in some instances fail to
take out-of-area can in some instances undermine political
cohesion within the alliance and thus breakdown Western
security in its largest sense.
The United States, by virtue of its economic and military
stature is the leader among the allies in involvement in out-
of-area actions. Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer were
vocal in their criticism of American unilateralism in 1956
and 1957. de Gaulle questioned the sustainability of NATO
within Europe if the allies could not agree on matters
outside of Europe. In 1958, de Gaulle suggested a
directorate within NATO in which the United States, Britain
44Marc Bentinck, NATO's Out-of-Area Problem, p. 3.
4 5Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, (Washington,
D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 63.
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and France would shape global policies of the Alliance.46
Predictably, the United States rejected the idea claiming the
it was an effort to expand the boundaries of NATO when, in
fact, the United States was using this excuse as more of an
attempt to avoid sharing in the decision making process.
Initially, the out-of-area problem became a bigger problem
because of a perception on the part of the western alliance
that the Soviet Union was furthering its influence in the
Third World. "Until quite recently, the most important
aspect of NATO's out-of-area problem stemmed from reactions
by West European allies to activities of the United States."'47
With the advent of Gasno. and Perestroika, there is a
belief among many Americans and Europeans alike that the
threat is gone. The threat, although taking a different
form, remains a threat. While it is evident that the Soviet
Union is not able or willing at this point to mount a
military advance through the Fulda Gap, the threat takes on a
different form in the shape of economic and political
instability Furthermore, the lack of a Soviet military
threat only serves to place the heretofore secondary threat
of Third World conflict at the forefront.
Herein lies the problem. NATO lacks a comprehensive,
consensus on how to deal with problems outside the
46Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 33.
47Stanley R. Sloan, NATO in the 1990's (Washington:Pergamon-Brassey's,
1989), p. 319.
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geographical region of the North Atlantic that threaten
allied interests and security. As discussed earlier, the
language of Article 6 outlining the boundaries is explicit
regarding the "scope" of the alliance for the purpose of
keeping potential adversaries out, but it is more than vague
when the question arises about the ability of allies to
assist other members outside those geographical guidelines.
In the early years of NATO, East-West relations were not
conducive to an organized and leisurely approach to forming
the military and political foundations of the alliance. Over
the course of 12 months in 1949 - 1950, the Soviet Union
exploded a nuclear weapon, the Chinese government succumbed
to a communist revolution and North Korean forces invaded
South Korea.4 8  The fledgling NATO alliance received a
"baptism by fire" into the realm of international relations.
In many ways, NATO's first action as a collective defense
organization was also a conflict "out-of-area." The impact
of the Korean War on the alliance was formidable and lasting.
B. NATO AND THE KOREAN WAR
"Although NATO was originally based on the defense of
Europe and North America against a perceived threat of
Communist aggression, the first direct military challenge to
the western allies came in Asia when, on 25 June 1950, North
48The North Atlantic Treaty took effect on August 24, 1949. Just six
days later the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. One month
later, Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China.
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Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and entered South
Korea." The Korean war is unique to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization not only because it was the first
conflict in which the Allies were engaged, but because it
was also an conflict outside the geographical perimeters of
the North Atlantic Treaty. In the Korean War, the Western
nations had obligations under the United Nations Charter but
not under the North Atlantic Treaty.49 The primary reason the
Alliance became involved was American emphasis that this
attack might be the beginning of a larger assault on the west
by the Soviet Union through Germany. In this way the United
States sought to involve its new allies of the North Atlantic
Treaty. It is the effort by nations to to ambiguously tie
their allies to conflicts that creates much disharmony within
the alliance.
Senator Vandenberg was adamant before the outbreak of the
Korean War that the alliance should only have and "efficient
nucleus" of forces capable of expanding in an emergency, but
quickly altered his position "after the Communists showed
their readiness to use force to gain their ends in the attack
on Korea."'50  Escott Reid recalled, "in the months that
followed the invasion of South Korea, the first step that
had to be taken was to build up the military strength of the
49Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance, p. 23.
50Arthur. H. Vandenberg Jr. ed., The Private Papers of Senator
Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 512-3.
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West so that the Russian-Chinese leaders would be encouraged
in future to be more cautious." He goes on to say, "We
believed that one reason for their lack of caution was their
military preponderance. The primary purpose of our
rearmament was to deter them from running risks which might
land us all in the catastrophe of an atomic war.''51
The Allies first engagement was not without controversy or
fear. Of the European allies, only Britain, Canada, and
Turkey sent forces to Korea. It also led to an American
insistence that Turkey and Greece be granted membership in
the alliance and the West Germany be rearmed in integrated
into the alliance. "The Korean War resulted in the
metamorphosis of the North Atlantic alliance into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization."'52
It was mutually understood by the nations of the west that
the United States was the only country that possessed
sufficient economic and military strength with which to deter
the Soviet Unions attempts to expand communism to the western
world. While many allies could not afford to provide economic
or military support, many also believed that the American
preoccupation with Asia would be at the expense of NATO which
brought into question American commitment to Europe.
Conversely, the United States had fresh in its memory the
51Escott Reid, "The Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy," India
Quarterly (April-June, 1958): 191-2.
52Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 238.
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Japanese attack on Pearl Ha.Dor. The Far East from the
American perspective was a Communist menace. The realization
soon hit the United States that NATO was ill equipped to
handle any assault on Europe much less an assault of the
scale believed the Soviet Union would use. The impact that
the Korean War had on the defense expenditures of the
alliance was formidable and lasting. United States
expenditures increased in real terms from $14 billion in 1950
to $43 billion in 1952 which brought total expenditures for
the alliance in 1952 to $54 billion dollars.5 3
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was definitely
affected by the Korean War. "The alliance had been energized
by an enormous increase in United States military aid: it
had created an impressive military and political organization
in the form of supreme commands and a secretary-general
secretariat; it had expanded the scope of the alliance
through the addition of Greece and Turkey to permit more
defensible postures in Europe; and it looked to the future
inclusion of West Germany as an inspired way both of
increasing the force capabilities of NATO and of ending the
long and deadly Franco-German rivalry. 54
The Korean war also served to blur American anti-
colonialism. The French used American rationale of "global
communist threat" to turn their conflict in Indochina into a
53ESCOtt Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 236.
54Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 53.
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fight against communist aggression. In this way the French
made the war in Southeast Asia an American War. The United
States believed the Soviet Union was an influential force
behind many conflicts in the world and this rationale has
been used to justify many American efforts to intervene in
global conflicts. Several problems result from the
divergent foreign policies of the NATO allies when dealing
with out-of-area problems such as defining interests,
threats, and responses to global conflict. The Korean war,
and the state of international affairs caused a definite
shift in U.S. foreign policy toward intervention as
demonstrated by the United States' initial involvement in
Indochina on the behalf of the French government. However,
it is important to understand the impact that anti-
colonialism had on the foreign policies of not only the
United States but on the policies of many European countries
as well.
C. SHIFTS IN ALLIED FOREIGN POLICIES
In the beginning, the alliance met resistant to collective
international involvement because of U.S. anti-colonial
attitudes. "The repudiation of colonialism has certainly
accompanied and at times even spurred American intentions to
keep the European allies' profile low on the international
stage."55  In fact, Andre Beaufre, commander-in-chief of the
5 5Peter N.Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 31.
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French expeditionary forces during the Suez crisis later
wrote that France's disappointment with America's policy in
the crisis finally convinced the French to pursue a nuclear
program on their own, to pull their troops out of NATO and to
distance themselves from American influence on European
allies.56
The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty heralded a major
shift in U. S. foreign policy from an isolationist to a more
global perspective. However, there remained a significant
reluctance on the part of U.S. administrators to support
British and French colonial endeavors. This is demonstrated
by the lengthy disputes surrounding Italian membership and
the French insistence to include Algeria in the North
Atlantic Treaty.
Original membership for the Italian government was hotly
contested during the negotiations of the North Atlantic
Treaty in the spring of 1948. Ironically, it was the fear
that Italy and France would fall to communist subversion
that worried European governments and ultimately elicited a
greater commitment from the United States in the Atlantic
Alliance. Additionally, there was opposition to Italian
membership for two reasons. First, Italy was not viewed by
the European allies to be a North Atlantic country.
Including a Italy would make it almost impossible to refuse
membership to Greece and Turkey. Including the Mediterranean
5 6Peter N.Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 32.
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countries, it was believed, would make it difficult to use
the alliance as a chrysalis for a North Atlantic community 57
After the communists were defeated in the French and
Italian elections, many Europeans tended to view their
membership as a liability rather than an asset. This stemmed
from the ever present debate about the geographical scope of
the alliance. However, it is interesting to note that the
British and possibly other members of the Brussels Pact
opposed Italian membership based on a belief that Italy would
attempt to make its acceptance of membership conditional on
the return to Italy its former colonies and also to solicit
revisions of the Italian peace treaty.58  The French seized
the opportunity as a means of clearing the way for inclusion
of Algeria and therefore, campaigned on the part of Italy for
membership. The French government had concluded that if it
pressed hard on both Italy and Algeria it might be able
negotiate a position where it would withdraw its demand for
Italian membership in return for acceptance of Algeria. 59
57Opposition came from the Benelux countries, Britain Canada and Norway
primarily because it was believed that Italy's admission would weaken
public support for the treaty in their countries. Escott Reid, Time of
Fear and Hope, p. 200.
58This information was known by J.D. Hickerson, then director of the
office of European affairs in the State Department. The United States
had stated that it would oppose any such attempt and that it had
received assurance from Italy that no such attempt would be made.
Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 202
59Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 203.
46
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the
Algerian departments of France were to be included in the
territory covered by the Pledge of Article 560. France was so
insistent that Algeria be included in the treaty that it
threatened to refuse signing the treaty if Algeria were
excluded. Other countries were not at all intrigued by the
obligation of helping France suppress Arab uprisings in
Algeria. 61  The Netherlands were at the forefront of the
objections being raised about the incursion of Algeria
primarily because if the territories and/or troops of an ally
around the world were attacked then there would be no
limitation on where the armed attack could occur further
expanding the obligation to provide assistance. The French
remained insistent that Africa north of 30 degrees be
included. The British were supportive at first but later
reconsidered their priorities and supported the exclusion of
Algeria. France's foremost argument was that Algeria was to
France as Alaska was to the United States. Furthermore, that
Algeria was integral in the defense of the French homeland.
Lord Gladwyn Jebb, under-secretary at the British Foreign
Office, was of the opinion that France's real motive was to
60After Algeria's independence, this portion of the treaty was
considered null and void
61EScott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 213.
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secure assistance from its allies to suppress any
nationalistic uprisings in North Africa. 62
Ultimately, France won the battle to have the three
departments of Algeria included, but the war to secure allied
assistance may have been lost nonethelesb. The decision
still rested with each country to provide assistance as
deemed necessary; therefore, the argument could easily be
made that an Arab nationalistic uprising is a French internal
problem and does not necessarily constitute a significant
threat to the North Atlantic community as such.
The United States foreign policy has been the object of
criticism from its allies on more than one occasion. The
problem with the United States is not so much one of wrongful
conduct but its inability or unwillingness to articulate
adequately the legal basis for its policies in ways that
would reassure at least its democratic friends. 63 Much of the
confusion over developing a common policy is that, for the
most part, European policy and positions are initiated in the
EPC rather than in the Alliance where the United States would
be included. This only serves to create even greater
disparity, disunity and lack of political cooperation and
reconciliation.
62Taken from the Canadian High Commissioner, (London), to Department of
External Affairs, Jan. 14, 1949, Tel 113. NASP., file 293(s), part 5.,
cited in Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 218.
63Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force, and
Reciprocity: A Comment on Professor Higgins' Overview," The Atlantic
Community Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Summer 1987): p. 162.
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The out-of-area problem is exacerbated by the dissimilar
foreign policies of the allied governments. For example, in
1954 there was a growing dispute between Britain and the
United States about what "western policy" should be towards
China and Formosa. The United States favored and entered
into a bilateral treaty agreement with the Nationalist
Chinese government of Formosa. The signing of this agreement
was tantamount to non-recognition of the communist government
in Peking. Britain, on the other hand, favored a "middle of
the line" approach which would basically allow both regimes
admittance to the United Nations. On 28 January 1955, a
joint resolution was passed by Congress granting the
President authority to secure Formosa and other "related
positions" important to their defence. The dispute over the
China question is indicative of the "difficulties of
achieving political solidarity within a regional alliance in
the face of conflicting allied interests and policies outside
the scope of the alliance." 64
Further evidence of alliance disputes and differing
policies are found in the realm of international trade.
"This is particularly evident in the politics of arms sales
in many parts of the globe where French, American British,
and -- increasingly -- German vendors engage in competition
for the sale of weapons of a magnitude threatening stability
64Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance, p. 190
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in the affected area as well as relations among the allies."
65
For example, French arms sales to Iraq intervened with
American Middle East policies in the mid 1980's.
D. VITAL INTERESTS
"There is no Alliance strategy to deal with undeniable
threats to energy and raw material resources required by the
West, to cooperate with the Third World, and to work together
on the menace of debt problems, communist subversion, and
state-subsidized international terrorism.''66 Furthermore,
members of the same alliance may have differing perceptions
of their commitments to other nations. In their article
"Limits to Intervention," Allison, May and Yarmolinsky
suggest that the United States may feel a greater sense of
national commitment to Britain than to, say, Greece or even
to Norway, despite an equal obligation to all. 67  These
differing perspectives on the commitment and obligation of
allies to each other provides a difficult barrier to defining
what are the collective vital interests of the alliance.
The United States alone is committed to different
alliances all over the world each with varied singular and
collective interests. Additionally, the problem is
65Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, (Boston:Twayne
Publishers, 1988), p. 169.
66Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 7.
67Graham Allison, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to
Intervention," Foreign Affairs, 48, no. 2 (January 1970): p. 248-9.
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exacerbated when situations and -nflicts arise involving
nations which are not bound by treaty with obligations to
provide assistance. For example, during the existence of the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) there was problem posed
by the dual membership of Turkey in NATO The United States
was only a member of the military committee of CENTO. It is
interesting to speculate what would happen if the Soviet
Union attacked a CENTO member such as Iran. If Turkey,
bound by CENTO Treaty obligation, came to the aid of its
ally, and was then subject to Soviet offensive action, then
the United States an the other members of NATO would have no
alternative but to regard this as an attack within the
meaning of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 68  The
conflict of interests that exists between alliance
memberships also inhibits NATO's ability to develop a
consensus on the out-of-area dilemma.
There also lingers a problem within the domestic political
arena of many countries including the United States. The
concept of national security is becoming a vague and obscure
phrase used to obligate forces and economic assistance in
some cases and deny them in other cases. "A victim of
complications arising from the Vietnam syndrome and from its
own internal contradictions, it [national security] has come
to mean in many minds unreasonable military demands,
68Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance, footnote 8, p. 25.
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excessive defense budgets, and collusive dealings within the
military-industrial complex. ",69
The crisis in the Falklands in 1982 stems from a dispute
between Argentina and Great Britain over the territorial
claim of the islands. Lawrence Freedman in his analysis of
the conflict states, "here is a clear act of aggression and
disregard of the principle of peaceful settlement of
international disputes." °70 The United States became involved
in the conflict from the beginning by sending Secretary of
State Alexander Haig as a mediator. South American allies
were insistent that the United States remain distant in the
conflict. Careful not to upset those ties the American
administration walked a fine line between innocent bystander
and active participant. As the British naval forces
approached the island, Secretary Haig confided that four
weeks of negotiation had proven fruitless and the United
States firmly committed itself in support of Britain.
The United Nations Security Council voted with ten of
fifteen states favoring the resolution condemning Argentina's
invasion 71 , Panama voted against, while the Soviet Union,
69Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Legitimate claims of National Security,"
Foreign Affairs 52, no. 33 (April 1974): p. 577.
70Mr. Freedman is a Professor of War Studies at King's College,
University of London. "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," Foreign
Affairs 61, no.. 1 (Fall 1982): p. 200.
7 11t is significant to note here that of the fifteen nations favoring
the resolution, four, Guyana, Uganda, Togo and Zaire, are Third World
countries.
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Poland, China and Spain aostained.72 Another important factor
to remember is the apparent lack of interest on the part of
the Soviet Union as evidence by their abstention in the
Security Council vote. Despite dependence on Argentinian
foodstuffs and traditional support for 'anti-colonial'
causes, little if anything, was directly at stake in the
crisis for the Soviet Union.73
One significant difference between the 1982 Falkland
Islands Crisis and the Grenada invasion of 1983, in terms of
alliance solidarity, is the ability of alliance members to
conceptualize their stake in the problem.74  There is some
speculation, however, on the commitment of Italy. Had the
war lasted much longer some critics suggest that Italy would
have distanced itself from the conflict and the alliance.
The European allies failed, however to recognize their
"stake" in the security of Grenada.
"During the brief British-Argentine war over the Falkland
Islands the United States had to choose between a neutrality
over a colonial relic in the South Atlantic, with all the
implications it had for relations with Latin America, and
NATO solidarity.",7 5 After failed attempts to negotiate a
72j.E. Spence, "The UN and the Falklands Crisis," in G. R. Berridge and
A. Jennings, eds., Diplomacy at the UN (New York:St. Martin's Press,
1984), p. 62.
73j.E. Spence, "The UN and the Falklands Crisis," p. 63.
74Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 168.
75Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 168.
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peaceful resolution, the United States opted to support the
Great Britain and the alliance. Although shaky at best, the
alliance stood together which indicates there is hope for
consensus on out-of-area issues. Now, in 1990, the alliance
is further exhibiting by its efforts in the Persian Gulf that
there is hope for developing a consensus on what threats
should dealt with collectively by the alliance.
E. DEFINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE THREAT
During the late 1980's, there was a prevailing American
perception of Europe's decline as a force in world affairs,
seemed to stem from a profound difference in interpretation
of politic -- of what policy, diplomacy, and Western strategy
is all about. '7 6  The problem is also aggravated by
conflicting European and American attitudes regarding the
nature and scope of the threat. The United States has sought
to deter and at times, defeat, efforts by the Soviet Union
and its proxies to impose their form of government upon other
states with the use of force.1 7  While Third World tensions
in and of themselves have always been viewed as important to
global security, they have also been considered by the United
States as a by-product of increasingly prevalent Soviet
expansionism. Europeans perceive that U.S. policies
towards Central America, for example, could have negative
76Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 61.
77Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force...," p. 169.
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impacts on West European public opinion and thus weaken the
bonds of the Alliance. 8  Furthermore, they argue that
Central America is far from the European theater and has no
bearing on the Alliance as a whole. However, unilateral
involvement by West European governments and by quasi-
official bodies like the West German political foundations
have cause concern among American Administrations.7 9
The United States continues to pursue a more global policy
perhaps in large part because based on the experiences in
two world wars, we have reached a conclusion that today's
world is simply too small for us to remain ambivalent about
armed aggression beyond our borders. 80  It is difficult for
the United States European allies to accept and often times
the American administration finds itself alone when dealing
with the "security threat" in South America. Then again,
there hasn't been unanimity among allies about France's
activities in parts of Africa or with Britain's insistence on
recovering the Falkland Islands. That individual allies
tend to interpret Soviet involvement in Third World areas
differently also points out two other factors: the concern
of most Europeans that the relatively stable East-West
environment not be jeopardized and that the United States is
78Robert Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of Area Problem," in Stanley
R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990's (Washington, D.C.:Pergamon-Brassey's
International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 320.
79Robert Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of Area Problem," p. 320.
8 0Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force...," p. 168.
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the most global nation in NATO.8' It is important to
understand the impact that differing allies viewpoints have
on alliance issues and that these disparities only make it
more difficult for the alliance to solve the out-of-area
problem.
The United States faces a similar problem on the domestic
front as well. Increasingly, administrations are finding it
more and more difficult to garner public support for
international activities and alliance responsibilities
abroad. The American public has not always relished the idea
of being the world's police force. In early 1954, the United
States began sending technicians to assist the French in
Indochina. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles issued his famous threat of "massive
retaliation" against Soviet communism. Congressional leaders
in Washington sensitive to the post-Korean mood of the
American public, however, were reluctant to see the United
States become involved in another frustrating military
engagement in Asia." There is a probl-m when a country, like
the United States, has a global economic and military reach,
it is difficult to differentiate between national security
interest and world police.
81Robert E. Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of-Area Problem," p. 325.
82Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance, (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p. 188.
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Critics have long commented that NATO's consultation
problems and divergent foreign policies have made it ill
equipped to generate a consensus on how to deal with the
Soviet threat to Europe. While this may be true, it is more
evident in NATO's dealings with out-of-area conflicts over
the past 40 years. Alliance perspectives differ on the basic
questions of what explains the cause and effect of conflicts
in the developing world. "While domestic problems -- ranging
from factional and religious infighting to pressing social
inequities and economic underdevelopment -- have been seen as
creating the conditions for such crises, Moscow's involvement
is believed to be their immediate cause, and is thus the
source of major American concern."'83  In other words, the
Europeans would tend to believe that conflicts in the Third
World more an economic problem while the United States tends
to view them as a military problem.
83Peter H. Langer, "Discord Over Out-of-Area Issue," Transatlantic
Discord and NATO's Crisis of Cohesion, (Washington, D.C.:Pergamon-
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1986), p. 39.
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F. DEALING WITH THE THREAT
Another significant factor contributing to the out-of-area
problem is European perceptions about where threats exist
and the action to be taken are often diametrically opposed to
those of the United States. The danger is that these
opposing viewpoints may hinder the Alliance's ability to
properly deal with the out-of-area problem. "Ironically,
America, as the long-dominant leader of the Alliance, has
contributed most to developing an Alliance that it now would
prefer to be different. ''84
As stated above, the United States initially resisted
involvement and assistance to its European allies in areas
outside of Europe as a protest against European colonialism.
The United States felt that colonialism on the part of its
allies would compromise NATO's ability to compete with
communism for the allegiance of new nations created by the
liquidation of former empires.85 While Britain and France
retain a somewhat limited ability to project power in extra-
European affairs, other NATO members remain sensitive to
being "dragged" into any kind of military involvement out-of-
area. 86 The debate usually results in the United States being
pitted against the rest of the alliance when the use of force
84Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, (Washington,
D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 27.
85Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 167.
8 6Narc Bentinck, NATO's Out-of-Area Problem, p. 16.
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is being considered. The Gulf region provides an excellent
example of creating more disharmony than unity. Mr. Brooks,
Acting President of the North Atlantic Assembly noted that
differences had develo.ed within the Alliance following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when member countries were
unable to fully agree on an appropriate response and these
differences only exacerbated already existing tensions.
87
Other problems arise when force is used to combat terrorism.
The Europeans view much of the problem as a failure to solve
the Arab-Israeli dispute and that the United States' policy
toward Israel only adds fuel to the fire.
G. CONSULTATION
There is a primary problem in the Alliance with
consultation on who and when to consult. The decision to
"consult or not to consult" is left up to the discretion of
the members rather than being a required action within the
treaty. By its very nature the treaty is dependent upon
effective and timely communication and exchange of
information.
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that
"Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of
any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is
87Thomas Peter Glakas, "Instability in the Gulf region A new challenge
for Western Security?" NATO Review, no. 1 (February 1981): p. 21.
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threatened."988 The alliance founders realized the importance
of such an article, however, the ambiguity of "in the opinion
of any of them" leave a great deal to interpretation and
this has caused strains within the alliance on more than one
occasion. As Escott Reid points out, "The strains may become
so severe that they will give rise to doubts about the
likelihood of some of the members of the alliance being
willing to carry out their obligations under the alliance if
war should break out." 89
Consultation is a significant factor in the effectiveness
of the alliance but it also remains a substantial barrier to
developing a solution to NATO's out-of-area problem. Each
of the NATO allies has at one time or another throughout the
history of the Alliance avoided the difficulties involved in
consulting ones allies about foreign policy. The adage, "it
is easier to beg for forgiveness than to ask for permission"
seems to fit appropriately as is evidenced in the case of
Britain and France in the Suez crisis or the United States in
Grenada.
The United States might have been able to draw a more
positive reaction from its European allies had there been
more effective consultation. When the United States invaded
Grenada in 1983, it evoked a Security Council reprimand
citing the intervention as a violation of international law.
88North Atlantic Treaty.
09EScott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 162.
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Britain abstained from the voting. France and the
Netherlands voted in favor of the resolution condemning the
action, but the United States used its veto power to block
the adoption of the resolution. It is ironic that the
United States utilized the same tactic in the Security
Council that the founders of the alliance were trying to
avoid when they created NATO under Article 51.
The United States terms its security interesLs in the
Caribbean Basin in terms of trade and trade routes. Almost
50% of all US trade (including substantial amounts of crude
oil) traverses the Caribbean basin. 90  Additionally, the
United States attempted to tie allied interest to Caribbean
citing that the reenforcement of Europe would be threatened
if these trade routes were hindered in any way.
The effects of the invasion of Grenada are still being
felt in the Alliance. "Apart from the action itself,
Europeans in unison have deplored American unilateralism,
which, it appears, intentionally neglected the rule of
consultation in the Alliance." 91 The tendency for America to
act unilaterally is a double edged sword. On the one side,
the United States cannot rely on allied assistance in out-of-
area issues. On che other side, the European allies are not
confident about the predictability of American foreign
90See Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on
Central Americi (New York:Ma,;millan Publishing Co., 1984), p. 110.
91Peter N.Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 48.
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policy. America, for a long time, has frustrated the Soviet
Union with the unpredictable nature of its foreign policy.
But it is questionable whether this approach is appropriate
or beneficial for European allies. The out-of-area issue
becomes a problem when a country stretches the limit of
"common interests" as the United States may have done with
Grenada and Panama.
Another example, is the British and French reactions
during the Suez Crisis in 1956. There was a reluctance on
the part of the alliance to discuss the Middle East problem
despite the fact the Western Europe was heavily dependent on
Middle East oil, which subsequently traveled through the Suez
Canal. As tension increased, Britain and France prepared for
military action by deploying forces to the Mediterranean.
The forces that were deployed had been originally assigned to
NATO or withdrawn specifically for service in Algeria and the
decision to use these forces was made without consulting the
North Atlantic Council.92
The complete breakdown of consultation in the alliance
again created an atmosphere of complete disintegration and
disunity in the alliance. Britain and France did not inform
the United States of their decisions until the last moment
to, more than likely, avoid any attempt by the Eisenhower
administration to delay or even implore them to abandon their
92Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance, p. 197.
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plans. The United States, to this point refused to become
involved in Middle East hostilities. The Soviet Union
proposed joint action with the United States to end the
aggression. "Although the United States categorically
rejected the Soviet proposal, the two leading world powers
did align themselves within the United Nations against the
Anglo-French-Israeli actions. ''93  Remarkably, the United
States had diplomatically allied itself with the primary
adversary of NATO. "This particular breakdown of consultation
and internal confidence was so severe that it acted as a
useful cathartic upon the members of the Alliance." 94
More effective consultation is being attempted through
regularly scheduled meetings of the North Atlantic Council,
however, greater commitment on the part of each member to
the necessity of timely consultation is necessary in order
to achieve a higher level of solidarity within the alliance.
Regardless of the decisions a country has for involvement in
issues or conflicts outside the alliance, effective
consultation is paramount in building cohesion and unity.
Timely consultations can eventually mean engagement and a
commitment to share responsibilities and burdens. 95  For
example, as Robert Turner points out about US involvement in
93Alvin J. Cot~rell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance, p. 199.
94Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960's (New York:Frederick A. Praeger,
1960), p. 104.
95Peter N.Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance, p. 89.
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Nicaragua, "Many European critics of the United States are
under the false impression that--as long time supporters of
the Somoza dictatorships--the United States launched an armed
proxy effort to overthrow the Sandinista regime because it
perceived the new Nicaraguan government as being Marxist-
Leninist and contrary to American interests in the region." 96
H. BURDENSHARING
Obviously with better consultation members could achieve
greater insights into and have better opportunity to
influence decisionmaking. The United States has always be
interested in seeing its European allies accept a larger
share of the expense in maintaining the alliance. In the mid
1950's, after the fear of a Soviet attack on Germany has
subsided, the United States began applying more pressure upon
its allies shoulder the burden of increased expenditures.
Europe's relief over America's strong support turned into
resentment. 97  European attentions turned away from the
conflict to their ravished economies.
What makes burdensharing a problem is the reluctance of
allies to provide military support while not having a say in
the political or military strategy, which was the case with
the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The cost of defense is
expensive and that added expense is usually not looked upon
96Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force...," p. 163.
97Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 45.
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in domestic political circles as necessary in peace time.
Likewise, it is difficult for countries to justify the
economic burden of building up and maintaining a military
force that is not completely under their control.
In October 1948, Canadian Prime Minister, St. Laurent
stated his realization that it was no longer important for
individual members of the alliance to have balanced forces
but that the alliance as a whole should be the one to have a
balanced force. 98  Prime Minister St. Laurent's comment is
accurate, however, practically speaking near impossible.
Defense departments in each nation are reluctant to
relinquish control of their forces. A lack of domestic public
support and basic trust within the alliance have prevented
the build up of an efficient low cost military defense force.
Efforts to coordinate, standardize and develop joint
coordinated defense production has resulted in a North
Atlantic armed force that cost much more than they otherwise
would; their efficiency in combat is lower; and an
opportunity has been lost to strengthen the unity of the
Atlantic community.99
Burdensharing is a problem that has evolved with the
alliance. The debate has been present throughout NATO's
involvement in extra-european affairs and as a result of its
own, internal politics. Additional problems are created when,
98Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 240.
99EScott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 240
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in the instance of the bombing of Libya in 1986, the United
States, in the view of many observers, was hampered in the
use of U.S. forces, deployed abroad to protect European
lives, when they were needed to protect American lives. 100
All of the intricacies of this problem is not a topic for
this paper, however, the burdensharing debate is a major
stumbling block and one that will have to be dealt with
before any viable international political consensus can be
agreed upon among the allies regarding out-of-area actions.
I. COLD WAR TENSIONS
But more importantly, is the influence of the Cold War on
NATO's reluctance or inability to act in out-of-area
conflicts. The chilly relatiuns between the United States
and the Soviet Union has caused apprehension on the part of
many European nations. Fear of reprisal or retribution
prevented many nations from supporting U.S. global foreign
policies. Expanding U.S. intervention in the Third World was
viewed by Europeans as antagonizing the Soviet Union. This
fear came about in large part from the Korean War when the
United Sta..es had difficulty in controlling General
MacArthur. "This chilling experience strengthened the belief
in Ottawa that the United States must be restrained, and that
the most effective means to influence the United States
10
°Robert E. Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of-Area Problem," p. 321.
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policies was to strengthen the procedures for consultation in
the North Atlantic Alliance.' 01
Similarly, many Europeans were hesitant about the United
States global policy as being to quick to resort to force.
"The United States, for reasons deriving in part from its
estimates of the situation in the Middle East and in part
from domestic political factors, is inclined to regard force
as the most appropriate and useful instrument of policy. 0 2
By it's nature as a political and military alliance, NATO
has inherent problems that develop when the out-of-area
problem is discussed. Difficulties that are inherent in
alliance relationships can be credited for causing problems
regarding consultation. Often times, the failure to consult
ones allies is an attempt to avoid pressure to abandon
unfavorable policies or actions. By the very nature of their
historical experiences, countries have differing perspectives
of what threats are detrimental to the security of the
alliance.
Even more difficult is developing a consensus on how,
exactly, to deal with those threats. Are there times when
immediate military force is necessary? Does one countries
opinion of a security threat warrant the expenditure of funds
by another countries that may not necessarily agree? These
101Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 240-1.
102Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do
better?" NATO Review 37, no. 5 (October 1989): pg. 23.
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are just a couple of questions that are present in almost
every conflict NATO has been involved in over the past 40
years. Now that the Soviet Union is no longer the formidable
threat it was perceived to be as short as one year ago, what
are NATO's chances of developing a strategy against an
unknown and less defined threat? Before the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, these questions that could only be speculated
about. However, a look at the alliance reactions to the
crisis in the Persian Gulf will provide some insight into the
possibility that NATO will actually resolve its out-of-area
problem.
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III. NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST
On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein unleashed Iraqi forces
against Kuwait. Considered to be a direct threat to global
security and to the vital interests of many countries, the
United Nations Security Council, in a surprising move, voted
unanimously to condemn the actions of Iraq. The world has
joined together to reverse the course of events and prevent
further aggression. At last the concept of collective
security as envisioned by its founders is apparently working.
"There is universal acknowledgement that the Middle East,
because of its geo-strategic location, its proximity to
Europe, its position athwart the air and sea lines of
communication to the Indian Ocean area and its vast reserves
of oil, is of the highest importance to the Atlantic
Alliance, and that member nations may well use force to
protect their interests there as they have in the past." °10 3
Yet NATO, as an alliance against aggression, has failed to
respond with more than moral encouragement. Much the same is
true about the Alliance response to the Gulf crisis of 1980.
Despite the virtual unanimous consent that vital Alliance
interests are threatened in an area outside the geographic
bounds of the North Atlantic Treaty, an overwhelming majority
103Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do
better?" p. 23.
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of the North Atlantic Assembly members agreed that individual
responses rather than a collective Alliance response was more
appropriate.1 0 4
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has, historically,
been reluctant to participate as an alliance in conflicts
"out-of-area" despite any impact these conflicts may have on
the interests of the alliance as a whole or the individual
member nations. If this alliance is so successful, why
hasn't NATO moved, as an alliance, to exert political and
military influence in support of the United Nations
resolutions against Iraq?
The members of the Alliance, all, either through military
or economic means, support the efforts of the United States
and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf. NATO's
geographical proximity, specifically the southern flank, to
the Middle East dictates that NATO cannot be decoupled from
the conflicts within this region. The Arab-Israeli conflict,
Iran-Iraq tensions not to mention the Cypriot-Turkish dispute
are all potentially explosive issues that greatly involve the
United States and the Soviet Unions interests. Thus a formal
recognition by NATO's political leadership of the linkage
between these local' conflicts and overall Western strategic
interests would go a long way toward breaking down the
104Thomas Peter Glakas, "Instability in the Gulf region A new challenge
for Western Security?" p. 21.
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artificial military boundaries that assume that NATO's
wartime responsibilities stop at the Turkish border.10 5
However, agreement beyond the common acknowledgement that
the Middle East is important an even vital to Western
Security interests is difficult to obtain. Priorities
differ, threats are viewed differently and the source of
threat cannot always be agreed upon. But more importantly,
nations are exceedingly hesitant to relinquish control of
their military and economic resources to a central command in
order to more effectively deal with global security threats.
But ideally, that is why each country has contributed to the
creation of the Allied forces on as much of a equitable level
as possible. It would only seem logical that NATO forces
should have an important role, representative of the alliance
as a whole, in conflicts such as the 1990 Persian Gulf
crisis. This would not preclude countries such as the United
States, Britain, and/or France from contributing on a
unilateral basis additional forces, equipment or monetary
resources to supplement NATO forces should they so choose.
The Persian Gulf is an ideal case study because of its
important role in the Western perception of global security.
A review of the historical experience of the United States
and the Alliance since the end of World War II is insightful
105Geoffrey Kemp, "East-West Strategy and the Middle East-Persian Gulf,"
in NATO--The Next Thirty Years, ed. Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder:Westview
Press, 1980), p.220.
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in helping to understand any alliance response, collectively
or unilaterally, to the current crisis in the Persian Gulf.
A. BACKGROUND
As the appeal of colonialism faded at the end of the
second World War, Third World countries endeavored to achieve
economic and political independence. In the Middle East, as
in most other Third World countries, the competition between
the superpowers superseded many nations efforts to gain
autonomy. This region has been a hotbed of tension between
the Soviet Union and the United States. While the west
continues to become more and more dependent on the Middle
East for oil, the Soviet Union views it more as a means to
obtain sea ports on the Indian Ocean than as a way to
strangle Western economies.,,,6
The realization by the United States and the Western world
that stable political relations with Arab Gulf states not
only ensures continued availability of a vital commodity
essential to the industrialized world, it also contains the
Soviets and the larger strategic problems they pose in the
area.1 0 7  Although not formally, the NATO alliance has
106Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West (Boston:Allen &
Unwin, 1987), p. 2.
107During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States each
viewed this area with great strategic important..albeit from far
different perspectives than their opponents imagined. Even now that the
Cold War is over, the area remains of vital importance, not only to the
superpowers, but to the entire world. The vast reserves of oil, as
already witnessed, if interrupted can impact significantly the economies
of every nation. Coupled with the ongoing debate over the Israel-Arab
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collectively regarded the Arab world as important to their
security. Interestingly enough, it is only in this region
that the NATO alliance has even shown an interest in
developing an collective policy for the region.
The period of 1946 to the early 1970's saw little change
in the Persian Gulf region. Britain retained its dominance
in the area despite a Soviet presence in Iran. By 1973,
however, the British began to reconsider their posture in the
Middle East. As the British slowly pulled east of the Suez,
the United States filled in the void, at least where security
responsibilities are concerned. The Soviet Union on the
other hand, was building its political influence to the point
where, by the mid 1970's, the Middle East was considered to
be the one area where a Soviet/US confrontation would be most
likely. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1978,
with its implications both for U. S. domestic politics and
for political stability in the Middle East, became and
increasingly important factor in the formulation of American
policy toward the region.-"
B. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST
The building of United States policy toward the region
began with the "Iranian Crisis" in 1946. First, Stalin opted
to leave Soviet forces in Iran past the deadline agreed upon
dispute, this region has enormous impact on the political and
international relations of each nation as well.
108Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 11.
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with the British for the mutual withdrawal. This furthered
the belief that the Soviet Union was attempting to extend
itself into the region. The Truman administration fashioned
its foreign policy after George Kennan's theory of
containment. Integral to that was the realization that the
United States could no longer be willing to react to Soviet
advances where ever they might occur. Rather, the United
States would have to define and defend certain geostrategic
locations with force if necessary.
Fearful that communist regimes in Greece and Turkey would
would benefit from a continued Soviet presence and topple the
governments, the Truman administration pressed for a Soviet
withdrawal. The Soviets pulled out in May. Their withdrawal
was followed by an administration response in 1947
introducing the Truman Doctrine which asserted that the
United States "must support free people who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures. ,,109
The second factor that shaped America's policy toward the
Middle East was the debate about the creation of an Israeli
state. The administration was divided about the impact of
the state of Israel claiming that it would jeopardize
relations with the Arab world. In other words, American
support for Israel might interrupt the flow of oil into
109John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War
1941-1947 (New York:Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 310.
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Europe and could endanger the success of the Marshall Plan.
Truman vacillated between the State and Defense departments
arguments for maintaining friendly Arab relations and the
domestic political pressures of public opinion. "Truman's
stance on the question of establishing a Jewish state seems
to have been determined by electoral considerations more than
any other single factor.,,"" With 5,600,000 Jewish people
residing in states with large numbers of electoral votes,
Truman publicly supported the creation of a Jewish state
largely to aid the Democratic party in the upcoming
congressional elections.1'' The impact of politics on the
creation of foreign policy is profound and not necessarily
the best barometer for formulating international relationr.
And so, the United States began a shaky relationship with
Israel that has undoubtedly had a significant impact on the
shaping of United States policies towards the Middle East.
During the Eisenhower administration, Middle East policy
was no nearer to a clear definition than before. The Suez
Crisis in 1956 further evidenced the United States inability
to differentiate between regional incidents and those more
important to United States interests. Eisenhower was
hesitant to send forces in support of British and French
initiatives because he feared such action would "outrage
11
°Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 16
111John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel
(Stanford:Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 42-44.
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world opinion and whether it would achieve permanent, soundly
based stability. '1 12  As mentioned earlier, the Suez Crisis
caused a rift between the United States, Britain and France.
Problems with consultation and resentment on the part of
Britain and France for America's lack of support was the
beginning of the end of British willingness to maintain and
presence in the Gulf.
Perhaps more importantly was the impact Israeli
participation in the crisis caused. Fr +-he first time,
Israel was involved with the West in a coordinated attack
against an Arab state. This only served as another step in
turning the Arab-Israeli dispute into an East-West
confrontation. This problem has not subsided through the
years and is one which the United States now faces against
Iraq in the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. With the advent of the
Eisenhower Doctrine, forces were deployed to the Middle East
to make clear to all, especially the Soviets, that the United
States was "fully determined to sustain Western rights in the
region. 113
C. NATO INVOLVEMENI IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The internal problims of NATO practically insure that
responses to out-of-area threats will remain limited and
unilateral at best. This problem is particularly evident in
1 12Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, New York:Doubleday,
1965), p. 37.
113Dw jnt D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 178.
76
Alliance response to the Middle East, especially in the last
decade. Since the general withdrawal of their forces from
the Middle East, Britain and France have remained
particularly sensitive to developments in the area to the
point that prestige and honor have shaped their reactions to
events as much as economic or strategic factors."14
The Suez crisis did much to shape the policies of the
Unite( States as well as Britain and France toward the
region. The Middle East, perhaps more than any other region
in the world, has caused United States to vacillate
unsteadily between the exigencies of Alliance solidarity and
the attractiveness of an independent US policy.115  The
controversy and disparity in alliance policy in the Middle
East is particularly evident in the events leading up to the
Suez crisis in 1956. At the international conference of
Canal "user" naticns held in London in August, 1956, there
was little evidence of NATO's political solidarity. The
United States was opposed to the use of American military
force in the crisis because of a refusal to implicate itself
with what was perceived as "blatant perpetuation of
imperialist thinking.
More importantly, however, was the perception that U.S.
involvement vould been seen as antagonizing the Soviet
114Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 164.
115Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the
Atlantic Alliance, p. 194-5.
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Union. The paradox here is that the United States often
times receives this same excuse from its allies in response
to American initiatives in the Third World. Already it is
easy to recognize the impact of differing perceptions each
ally has regarding involvement in conflicts. Perceptions
change and are motivated by differing national interests and
the real or perceived ramifications of involvement to
domestic political support. The British and French viewed
the threat by Nassar in Suez as directly impeding "western
interests." The United States, on the other hand, saw no
such impact and was annoyed by its allies refusal to
"conform" to U.S policy in the region.
This pattern is particularly evident not only in NATO's
history in the Middle East but in most of its dealings with
out-of-area conflicts. This is partly because of the United
States preeminent role in the Alliance and partly because the
Europeans are particularly desirous of not being subjugated
by that American role. "European dependence upon American
power, in combination with Washington's perceived
exploitation of its dependence, compelled Britain and France
to act without informing the United States, if only to
demonstrate that they still had an independent role in the
Middle East. ''116
Alliance cooperation in the Middle East went only as far
as the agreement that the West was dependent on oil and that
116Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 166.
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any disruption to that oil supply played havoc with their
economies. The 1973 war broadened the impact to the entire
alliance and the international economy to the point that
every country within NATO watched with particular interest
the developments in the Middle East region. This was the
beginning of a somewhat unified approach to developing an
alliance policy toward the region, however, a formal policy
has yet to be concluded.
What was clear to the Western Europeans is that an
unqualified support of Israel and United States policy
toward the Middle East could posed more of a threat to their
economic relationship with the Arab world than the Soviet
Union. This further clarifies the reason why U.S. and
European views diverge in the development of policy.
Conversely, the 1973 War raised within NATO the question
of the deployment of U.S. troops to the Middle East. The
United States all to often would assume that initiatives in
the Middle East were in support of the Alliance and thereby
warranted the use of NATO resources. Although there was no
formal agreement, Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs, asserted that U.S. forces in
Europe were dual purpose and that these troops could be
diverted from Europe to the Middle East without NATO
approval. 117 The Europeans, however, were of a different
1l7u.s. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S.-- European
Relations and the 1973 Middle East War (Washington: D.C.:Defense
Publishing, 1974), p. 37.
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mindset. so much so that during the 1973 war, their fear of
eliciting Arab retaliation took the form of a denial of
refueling rights to the United States in European airspace.
Europeans have and still do view problems in the Third
World from an economic standpoint while the United States
continues to view it from the perspective of Soviet
intervention. Because of its role as the chief arbiter in
the Arab--Israeli conflict, its position as the dominant arms
supplier to states throughout the region, and the political
leverage and military strength associated with its superpower
status, the United States emerged as the Western state
primarily responsible for formulating and executing policies
to protect Western interests.-!
But to attribute the divergence entirely to North-South
vs. East-West would be an over simplification. The late
1960's saw an increase in dependence on Middle East oil
which contributed to a growing pro-Arab stance by West
European governments. In particular French policy underwent
a dramatic change from its earlier pro Israeli orientation
during De Gaulle's' tenure, and especially at the time of the
Six Day War 1967.119 The United States, as mentioned above,
has a large Jewish political base; an attribute which is not
found to the same extent in Europe. The Europeans began to
118Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 7.
11 9walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr , Atlantic Community in
Crisis A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship (New
York:Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 300.
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promote and develop "European" responses to events in the
Middle East primarily as a means to get out from under U. S.
domination. "Thus it was the strong support of the United
States for Israel as much as the pro-Arab inclination within
Europe that led to a divergence within the alliance on policy
toward the Arab--Israeli conflict.,1 20  Policy was being made
by the Europeans, not as an effective means to deal with
Third World conflict, rather as a means to gain autonomy from
the United States.
Another problem with NATO's record in the Middle East is
that many Europeans attribute the antagonism directed against
the West, including terrorist activities, as a failure to
resolve the Palestinian question, a failure which has for the
most part been blamed on the United States 'blank cheque'
policy towards Israel.1 2  While this in and of itself is a
topic worthy of greater mention than can be achieved here, it
is important to realize its impact domestic political actions
can have at an international level and on NATO's out-of-area
problem.
The Alliance has been involved in recent years with the
four-power intervention in Lebanon in 1982-3, the
minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea
in 1984 and the two efforts, in 1980 and 1987, to protect
12 0Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 169
12 1Joseph :. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do
better?", NATO Review 37, no. 5 (October 1989): p. 23.
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shipping passing through the Straits of Hormuz. While the
forces engaged varied considerably in size, in nature and
combat involvement, these operations had a number of
similarities which bear mention. 122  Noted analyst Joseph
Coffey suggests four common factors that were evident in each
of these operations. To begin with, the Americans were
primarily the motivating force behind these efforts in the
Middle East. Secondly, these operations ultimately involved
many of the allies. Third, when involved the Europeans
resisted any effort for a coordinated approach as evidenced
by the French, Egyptians, Saudi Arabians and Italians working
essentially alone. Finally, with one exception (Lebanon
82/3), these operations were basically a success despite
their low level and mundane nature having relatively little
hostility.
Taking this first factor, American motivation behind these
operations, the United States has historically, been the only
influential power that could rival any Soviet response to
Third World conflict. This stems from the United States
economic position and the problems discussed at length in
Chapter two regarding the differing viewpoints on the source
of conflict. Americans tend to view the Soviet Union as the
provicator behind instability and aggression not only in the
Middle East but around the globe.
122joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do
better?" p. 22.
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That NATO can agree to the necessity for a unified
approach to the out-of-area problem at least where the Middle
East is concerned is a major accomplishment considering their
track record to date. But the Soviet invasicn into
Afghanistan only served to prove, once again, that the
alliance is in disarray where the out-of-area conflicts
arise. The first problem is that the alliance, originated
from the Soviet threat, could not develop a consensus on what
steps should be taken against that very same enemy for the
overt aggression against a third party outside of Europe.
The United States tried to generate support for collective
action while the Europeans were reluctant to be involved.
The problems posed here are multiple. A unified collective
approach is necessary for any economic sanctions to be
remotely effective.
There was also an apparent lack of communication or
consultation between any of the allies >egarding the type of
action taken, unilateral or collective. Reciprocal
recriminations arose over the lack of consultation on Middle
East issues -- Western Europe accusing the United States of
developing a condominium relationship with the Soviet Union,
and the United States expressing displeasure with the lack of
consultation by the European Community in the formulation of
a European approach to the Middle East. 123
12 3Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr eds. Atlantic Community
in Crisis A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship, p. 301.
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The West Germans were concerned about the trade
relationship they had established with the East, the British
were supportive of the United States, but hesitantly based on
the reaction of their European counterparts and the French,
in no uncertain terms, did not want to be remotely connected
with the European alliance and proceeded on a unilateral
course of action be sending a delegation to the Soviet Union.
Geography was also proffered as a reason for avoiding the
issue at hand when Chancellor Schmidt suggested that the
issue be taken before the United Nations council. 124
D. THE 1990 PERSIAN GULF CRISIS
Manfred Woerner,NATO Secretary General, reacting to the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and he threat posed to European
security, stated recently that "We have to face the question
how NATO's security mission can address these new dangers
arising from regional conflicts directly affecting the
security of our member nations." He goes on to say, "Let me
state clearly that I am not advocating an alliance which
would claim responsibility for every global problem and
attempt to police every regional dispute. Yet to
124
"Bonn and U.S. Plann Arms talks in Wake of Soviet Afghan Moves," New
York Times, 5 January 1980.
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realistically recognize the limits of collective alliance
action should not become an excuse for passivity."'
125
Despite the important role the alliance has in this
particular crisis, NATO, as an alliance has failed to react.
Initial reactions were piece-meal and hesitant. One critic
noted, "If they [Europeans] want aggression to be defeated,
energy prices and supplies kept secure and a voice in matters
of war and peace, they will have to stop playing games and
start paying their share."'2'  Was this slow reaction on the
part of the allies a conservative move or just another, "let
the American's handle it"? It would be difficult if not
impossible to speculate an answer. However, it would not be
difficult to visualize an coordinated joint response where
there a consensus in writing on exactly how the alliance
should handle these conflicts.
One particularly important reason why NATO should be at
the forefront of any operation in the Persian Gulf is
organization and operation of multinational forces. While
there are always inherent problems with forces of different
nations operating together, NATO forces at least have the
benefit of joint exercises with a command structure capable
of managing such operations. At a very basic level, the
125Excerpts from speech in Istanbul by NATO Secretary General on the
fundamental changes in Western security requirements in "NATO Remains
Indispensable," Aviation Week & Space Technology 133, no. 18 {October
29, 1990): p 7.
126
"Where's Their Fair Share?" New York Times, 6 September 1990.
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United States, although retaining authority over gulf
operations outside the Saudi border, must first seek Saudi
approval on command decisions where Saudi defense is
concerned.127  This combination of national self-interest and
overall strategic objectives do not mesh. With more than 20
nations having forces in the Mideast now, armed with
dissimilar weapons and equipment basic geographical zones of
responsibility have been assigned, similar to the "layer cake
defense" used by NATO in Germany at the end of World War
11.128
There are other reasons that NATO should take the
initiative for a more active role as an alliance in the
crisis. Even if it is only political and economic support as
is the case of Japan, in one way or another, all the allies
are supporting the initiatives. Why not act as an alliance?
The formidable posture of NATO poised to ward off any move by
the Soviets across the border into Germany is viewed as being
successful. Would not the same hold true for the Saddam
Hussein's of the world? It appears to be easily forgotten
that the reason the nations of the Atlantic joined together
to form NATO is that there is safety in numbers. There was a
basic belief that if a country believed an attack made on one
127
"Gulf Diplomacy," Aviation Week & Space Technology 133, no. 20 (12
November 1990): p. 19.
128John D. Morocco, "U.S. Opposes Formal U.N. Command Role in Middle
East," Aviation Week & Space Technology 133, no. 18 (29 October 1990):
p. 23.
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country would be dealt with the wrath of all countries, then
the security of those countries would best be served as an
alliance against aggression. The basic theory of deterrence
does work in many cases. In those instances where it does
not work, then those allied together must be committed to
assisting in defeating aggression.
Secondly, geographical limitations are not a valid reason
for avoiding political or military actions in the gulf. NATO
has acknowledge that their access to raw materials is a vital
interest. Even now, it has been suggested that NATO cannot
become involved in this dispute unless Iraq attacks Turkey.129
As discussed in Chapter I, the geographical limitations
outlined in the Treaty is a boundary of obligation among
treaty members. All that is needed for NATO to participate
in the gulf operations is a consensus that (1) a vital
interest is being threatened and, (2) the alliance must do
something about it. "New institutions would not solve any of
the Third World problems facing the West and certainly would
not remove the existing perceptual differences between the
United States and its allies concerning how to deal with
those problems. Informal military or nonmilitary cooperation
outside the NATO area will either be possible or not, based
129See "Europe, Minus Germany, Increase Military Support for Blockade of
Iraq," Aviation Week & Space Technology 133, no. 9 (27 August 1990): p.
26.
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on the political judgments made by the allies and by their
capabilities. 130
1. Lack of Cold War Tensions
The world saw unprecedented change in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union when Iraq invaded Kuwait. On one hand
the uncertainty of how to deal with an old foe now friend was
disquieting. On the other hand, there was equal uncertainty
about how to deal with security threats that were
unpredictable and uncertain. As Iraqi tanks rolled across
the border into Kuwait, one thing was certain, the repugnance
was unanimous. As w3ll, the response was more immediate than
ever before. Not even when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan
was there such a show of support. Obviously, the effects of
the Cold War's end are being seen.
The United Nations Security Council has found new vigor
and stature in the world community. And for the first time
in 45 years, the Soviet Union is again on the side of the
Alliance. "By getting the Soviets to join in the
condemnation of the invasion, by rushing to the defense of
Saudi Arabia and by winning mandatory sanctions from the
United Nations, the United States and its partners have
denied Hussein and political cover for his invasion and
13 0Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future Toward A New Transatlantic Bargain,
(Washington D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1985), p.151.
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deprived him of any room to hide. 3 1 Certainly, this might
breed reassurance within the Alliance that unity and cohesion
in actions out side of Europe is not only possible but
necessary.
There are some significant milestones achieved in this
crisis that make separate it from other attempts at allied
efforts out-of-area. First and foremost is the effective
use of consultation by the allies, especially the United
States. The Bush administration immediately realized that in
order for any action to be effective against Iraq, they would
need not only the support and assistance of their NATO allies
but the support of countries outside the alliance, namely the
the Soviet Union and China. The best way to achieve this
support was through the United Nations. The Bush
administration embarked envoys around the world on missions
of consultation to drum up support for an effective strategy
in the Gulf. Secretary of State James Baker 3rd met with the
NATO foreign ministers in on the to discuss the results of a
United States-Soviet summit in Helsinki. As well, Secretary
Baker briefed the NATO allies on plans for pressuring Iraq to
leave Kuwait. The result of the consultative meeting were
commitments from West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
13 1Rick Atkinson and David Hoffman, "High-Stakes Gambling in the Gulf,"
The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 7, no. 1 (20-26 August
1990): p. 6.
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Norway Greece and Denmark to supplement the forces already
supplied by France, Britain and the United States. 132
All too often in the past, the alliance has bee.. faced
with conflicts that threaten the security of one or more
members nations.As with the United States in Grenada and the
British/French action in the Suez, consultation was withheld
primarily to avoid pressure from other allies to abandon
military action. However, failure to consult ones allies
only fosters resentment and mistrust.
Another milestone that was achieved is that the United
States has resisted the temptation to "shoot first and ask
questions later." The United States has been criticized for
resorting to force to quickly in the past. By first seeking
economic sanctions through the United Nations Security
Council, the United States was undoubtedly able to secure
more support and cohesion among not only its NATO allies but
the rest of the Unite- Nations as well. Perhaps this show of
discretion will go a -ong way towards building confidence
among the Atlantic allies that support of United States
initiatives does not always begin with firepower.
This is not to paint a rosy and blissful picture of all
that has happened regarding the alliance participation in the
Gulf crisis. Despite admission that "an embargo without
sanctions would be a sham," France has stated emphatically
132Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Merbers to Weigh Adding Troops to Gulf
Force," New York Times, 11 September 1990.
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that it will retain sole control over French military forces,
deciding when or even if they will participate in any
military action that might occur in the Gulf.1 33  France has
had ambiguities in its NATO policy and statements such as
this can prove detrimental to allied confidence as well as to
the success of the alliance regarding joint military
operations.
Similarly, each nation has a domestic political battle
to wage at home. President Bush enjoyed overwhelming support
from the American public at the beginning of this joint
venture. Seventy-six percent of the people polled in a New
York Times/CBS News Poll "approved of the job Mr. Bush was
doing as President. i34  However, as was discussed above, one
cannot dismiss the idea that politicians often times make
decisions based on the ability of the public to support their
initiatives.1 35  Already there is animosity and bitterness
surfacing from the American people that Americans should not
have to go to war to keep the price of oil low. It is
questionable that such a high level of public support will
be maintained if American soldiers are killed. The
133Alan Riding, "More Europeans to Join Gulf Force," New York Times, 22
August 1990.
134This is also the same figure reached after the invasion of Panama.
Michael Oreskes, "Bush Regains Record Rating in Crisis," New York Times,
22 August 1990.
13 5See footnote 7, regarding Truman's decisions about the creation of a
Jewish State. Also see Chapter One regarding Congressional decision
about the creation of the No.th Atlantic Treaty.
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uncertainty of why American forces are in the Gulf can
jeopardize public support which, as was seen in the Vietnam
War, disastrous.
For these reasons it is paramount that NATO develop a
comprehensive and unified policy for dealing with out-of-
area conflicts. Furthermore, the United States, as well as
its allies, must subscribe and stand firmly behind a mutually
agreed upon out-of-area policy. This agreement must include
what the vital interests of each nation are as well as the
alliance as a whole. The command structure already exists
within NATO to formulate strategies for dealing with threats
to the European theater as well as those that lie out side
the NATO area. This will require that each nation be willing
to compromise to some degree, national perspectives for the
sake of international cooperation.136 If the alliance
continues to recognize that there are security threats to
their vital interests yet, support unilateral actions on the
part of member nations, then the alliance is nothing but a
name. The "safety in numbers" quotient is nullified and
potential aggressors will capitalize on this weakness. It
could well be that Saddam Hussein was banking on the chaos
and disunity that has plagued alliance efforts in the past.
This is the time to send a very clear signal to the other
potential Hussein's that the alliance really was a success
136Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future Toward A New Transatlantic Bargain,
p. 154.
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against the Soviet Union and will do the same for those that
choose to threaten its well being.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The out-of-area problem is one that has existed in NATO
since its inception. The Korean War brought to bear the
impact that conflicts outside the geographical boundaries
outlined in the treaty could have on the security of the
alliance as a whole and its members. That NATO has survived
over the past forty years in and of itself makes it an
anomaly. Historically, alliances were created to achieve a
primary goal, after which, the common purpose is gone and
with it, the alliance. NATO has survived periods of tension,
detente and ;ltimately witnessed the withdrawal of its
primary adversary to a position of diplomatic alliance in the
Persian Gulf. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, many
observers felt that it signaled the end of not only Soviet
hegemony in Europe, but the end of NATO as well. Primarily
this is because the common threat, namely the Soviet Union,
no longer poses a serious threat. Apparently, it is not the
end of NATO.
But NATO's road to survival has not been completely paved
with success. There remain inherent problems that, if not
solved, may be detrimental to its continued success. The
out-of-area dilemma is exemplary of this. With the Soviet
Union assuming on a more passive posture, the threat to
security from Third World instability and extra-European
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conflicts now becomes the primary concern for the European
alliance. The Persian Gulf is evidence of the type of
problem that NATO must prepare for in the future. The
military st:ucture that has been developed is designed
primarily to resist Soviet advance through the Fulda Gap into
Germany. NATO has not prepared itself for military acticn
outside the European theater, yet, the military encounters
NATO members have been involved in the past have been just
that, outside the NATO boundaries.
Other problems are evident in NATO's ability to develop an
out-of-area strategy. Consultation is imperative to
effective alliance relationships and developing cohesion and
trust between members. At one time or another, many of the
NATO members have adopted the philosophy that it is easier to
ask for forgiveness than beg for permission. The allies can
not afford to avoid consulting their allies in hopes of
avoiding negative responses. The converse also holds true.
Each member must accept that their continued security will
require, at times, assistance and support in extra-european
affairs. Herein is where a mutually agreed on strategy for
dealing with out-of-area conflicts would help diminish the
negative effects of the burdensharing debate.
The relaxing of Cold War tensions provides an excellent
opportunity for NATO allies to resolve the out-of-area
problem. A comprehensive definition of common interests,
such as protection of access to raw materials, is essential
to fostering a more cohesive alliance. With commonly defined
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and agreed upon intersts, there is far less ambiguity and
hesitation on when and how threats to the security of the
alliance will be met. As well, NATO has a role in
maintaining the status quo (as it was prior to the invasion
of Kuwait), after all, suppressing Soviet desires to expand
communism was, essentially, maintaining world order.
NATO has survived 40 years of turbulent international
relations. To make NATO's out-of-area problem an asset can
best be achieved through consultation and cooperation.
America must value partnership and participation if it is to
have allies that will act to preserve and promote the freedom
and democracy. Likewise, the Europeans must share
responsibilities as well as opportunities to maintain Western
security guarantees. It simply will not suffice to have the
European partners in the alliance wait for probable
unilateral action by the United States.
It is difficult at best to speculate about the nature of
international relations in the future. However the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait is the dose of reality necessary to
ensure that the alliance, as well as the world, realize that
the Soviet Union is not the only threat to Western security,
that the economic stability of the world can be drastically
affected by the actions of a renegade nation and that the
deprivation of sovereignty of any nation is a threat to
every nation. NATO has an important role in the Persian Gulf
as does every nation. Not because Europe receives the bulk
of its oil from the Middle East, but, because of the need to
96
impress upon the Saddam Hussein's of the world that the
sovereignty of every nation is sacred and that this type of
aggression will not be acceptable.
NATO has withstood the test of time. Its apparent success
against the Soviet Union is a testimony that alliances based
on shared interests are possible. Nothing is permanent but
NATO remains a symbol of stability and a reminder that not
all is subject to change.'37  As envisioned by its founders,
NATO might well be the genesis of a more global collective
security arrangement.
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